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 Pokhran H
 The Prospects and Sources of
 New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program
 On May 11 and 13,
 1998, India set off five nuclear devices at its test site in Pokhran in the
 northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan-its first such tests in twenty-four
 years. The initial test had been carried out at the same site on May 18, 1974.
 Not unexpectedly, as in 1974 much of the world community, including the
 majority of the great powers, unequivocally condemned the Indian tests.' The
 coalition national government, dominated by the jingoistic Bharatiya Janata
 Party (BJP), knew that significant international pressures would be brought to
 bear upon India once it breached this important threshold. Yet the BJP chose
 to disregard the likely adverse consequences and departed from India's post-
 1974 "nuclear option" policy, which had reserved for India the right to
 weaponize its nuclear capabilities but had not overtly declared its weapons
 capability. National governments of varying political persuasions had adhered
 to this strategy for more than two decades.
 A number of seemingly compelling possibilities have been offered to explain
 India's dramatic departure from its policy of nuclear restraint. None, however,
 constitutes a complete explanation. Yet each offers useful insights into the
 forces that led to the Indian nuclear tests. One explanation holds that the
 chauvinistic BJP-led government conducted the tests to demonstrate both its
 own virility to the Indian populace and India's military prowess to the rest of
 the world. A second argument suggests that the BJP conducted the tests to
 cement its links with contentious parliamentary allies. A third argument con-
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 1. For a compendium of official reactions to the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, see "India
 and Pakistan Nuclear Tests: Details and International Reaction," Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 20
 (May 1998), pp. 1-20. A small debate has arisen over the number and quality of both the Indian
 and Pakistani tests. See Robert Lee Hotz, "Tests Were Exaggerated by India and Pakistan,"
 International Herald Tribune, September 17, 1998, p. 1; and Raj Chengappa, "Is India's H-Bomb a
 Dud?" India Today International, October 12, 1998, pp. 22-28.
 International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 148-177
 ? 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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 tends that these tests were designed to bolster India's prestige in the interna-
 tional system. A fourth argument focuses on the role of key Indian scientists
 in endowing nuclear weapons with mythical significance.
 My analysis draws upon components of the various proffered explanations
 and seeks to develop them in a historically contextualized fashion. I argue in
 this article that three factors impelled India toward its 1998 nuclear tests: fifty
 years of critical political choices, influenced by ideology and the imperatives
 of statecraft; fitful scientific advances in India's nuclear infrastructure; and an
 increased perception of threat from China and Pakistan since the end of the
 Cold War.
 The debates and decisions pertaining to India's nuclear weapons program
 can be divided into five distinct phases, each of which brought the country
 closer to the May 1998 tests. The first phase began with the creation of India's
 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1948; the Chinese nuclear test in 1964
 marked the beginning of the second phase; the third comprises the buildup
 and execution of India's first nuclear test, in 1974; the fourth began in the
 aftermath of that test; and the fifth brought India from the collapse of the Soviet
 Union in 1991 to the tests in 1998. At each of these stages and, more important,
 at each of the crucial points where decisions were made to take India closer to
 nuclear weapons status, the three factors outlined above can explain India's
 nuclear decisions.2 India's perceptions of external threats and the reactions of
 the great powers to its security concerns played a fundamental role in driving
 the nuclear program. Segments of the scientific community within India, at
 these critical junctures, not only enabled but encouraged the program's devel-
 opment. Finally, the most critical element involved the political choices made by
 the Indian national leadership. A sixth section assesses a number of proffered
 explanations for the Indian tests and discusses the prospects for regional stability.
 Phase One: The Origins of India's Nuclear Program
 The Indian nuclear program in a sense predates India's independence from the
 British Empire in 1947. The civilian program can be traced to the work of the
 Indian physicist Homi J. Bhaba, who had studied with the eminent nuclear
 scientist Lord Ernest Rutherford at Cambridge University in the 1930s. Upon
 his return to India, Bhaba persuaded one of India's industrial giants, the Tata
 2. India's quest for great power status also, in some measure, contributed to the nuclear tests. But
 this explanation has received inordinate emphasis, especially in the Western press, to the neglect
 of other, more compelling explanations. See, for example, Pankaj Mishra, "A New Nuclear India?"
 New York Review of Books, June 25, 1998, pp. 55-64.
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 family, to contribute money toward the creation of a center for the study of
 nuclear physics. The Tata Institute for Fundamental Research opened in Bom-
 bay in 1945. After India's independence, Bhaba convinced India's first prime
 minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, of the signal importance of atomic energy research
 in enabling India to build an industrial base and to tackle the overwhelming
 problems of entrenched poverty. Bhaba's views impressed Nehru, who had a
 fundamentally scientific demeanor.3 From the outset the Indian atomic energy
 establishment, under the direction of the prime minister, enjoyed a high degree
 of autonomy and was largely shielded from public scrutiny.4 Bhaba, as the first
 head of the Department of Atomic Energy, created on August 3, 1954, worked
 zealously to preserve the organizational autonomy of India's nuclear energy
 estate. Shortly after India's independence, the AEC had been established under
 the Department of Scientific Research, and, in accordance with India's strategy
 of economic self-reliance, every effort was made to keep the program indige-
 nous. Perforce India had to obtain some assistance in reactor design from the
 United Kingdom and from Canada.
 Publicly, Nehru opposed the development of nuclear weapons, a position
 that accorded with his deep-seated opposition to the use of force to resolve
 international disputes.5 This conviction, in part, stemmed from the Gandhian
 legacy of the Indian nationalist movement. Nehru's aversion to nuclear weap-
 ons also drew from his fundamental fear of the militarization of Indian society.6
 Additionally, his opposition was an outgrowth of his firm beliefs about the role
 of the use of military force in world affairs.7 Nehru believed that military
 spending was, at best, a necessary evil.8
 3. On this point, see Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York:
 Praeger, 1962), p. 136.
 4. For particularly strident criticisms of the lack of accountability in the Indian nuclear program,
 see David Brown, Nuclear Power in India: A Comparative Analysis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983).
 5. There has been some speculation during the last decade that, despite his public stance, Nehru
 wanted to keep India's weapons option open. On Nehru's ambivalence toward nuclear weapons,
 see Peter Lavoy, "Learning to Live with the Bomb? India and Nuclear Weapons, 1947-74," Ph.D.
 dissertation, University of California, 1997, especially pp. 153-158.
 6. Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
 7. Western commentators have often commented on Nehru's willingness to use force in Kashmir
 in 1947-48 and subsequently in Goa in 1960. These charges of hypocrisy are largely polemical. The
 Kashmir war involved the defense of a besieged state. In the Goan case all negotiated attempts to
 induce the Portuguese to withdraw peacefully from their anachronistic colonial enclave failed.
 Only under these conditions did Nehru authorize the use of force. The literature on Kashmir's
 accession to India and the subsequent war is voluminous; for a dispassionate account, see H.V.
 Hodson, The Great Divide (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985). For a particularly thoughtful
 account of the Goa question and India's resort to force, see Arthur Rubinoff, India's Use of Force in
 Goa (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971).
 8. Even a quick perusal of his many writings reveals the depth of these convictions. See, for
 example, Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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 As prime minister, Nehru enunciated a policy of nonalignment, principally
 to distance India from the superpower struggle. Both the Western and Soviet
 blocs derided this doctrine, especially when it was inconsistently applied.
 Nevertheless, Nehru refused to be swayed. He spoke out vigorously against
 the growing nuclear arsenals of both superpowers and sought to reduce inter-
 national tensions in various parts of the world.9
 Despite his public opposition to nuclear weapons, Nehru granted Bhaba a
 free hand in the development of India's nuclear infrastructure. Meanwhile, he
 sought to lay the necessary foundations should a political decision to acquire
 nuclear weapons be made. In pursuit of this end, Bhaba worked inexorably
 toward a complete mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and toward a completely
 indigenous production process. As early as 1958, Bhaba had a conversation
 with the British physicist and defense adviser Lord P.M.S. Blackett about his
 interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.10 Four years later, India's disas-
 trous war with China likely reinforced Bhaba's interest in pursuing the nuclear
 weapons option.11
 THE 1962 SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
 A turning point in the Indian foreign policy establishment's attitude toward
 defense spending came in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war of
 October 1962. After invading India along the Himalayan border, the Chinese
 People's Liberation Army routed the ill-equipped and ill-prepared Indian army
 and came to occupy some 14,000 square miles of Indian territory. Worse still,
 the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire after achieving their territorial
 objectives, thereby humiliating Nehru and the Indian political leadership.12
 The significance of this war on India's foreign and security policymakers
 cannot be underestimated. The Chinese attack fundamentally called into ques-
 tion Nehru's varied attempts to court the Chinese and to bring China into the
 comity of nations: he had expressed the mildest condemnation of the harsh
 Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950; had readily ceded India's extraterritorial
 9. For a discussion of the philosophical origins of nonalignment and the quest for an alternative
 world order, see A.P. Rana, The Imperatives of Nonaligiiinent (Delhi: Macmillan, 1976). For a discus-
 sion of the practice of nonalignment and Nehru's attempt to defuse international tensions in a
 neighboring region, see D.R. Sardesai, Inldian Foreigni Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnamn, 1947-
 1964 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
 10. See Shyam Bhatia, Iindia's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad, India: Vikas, 1979), p. 114.
 11. For a discussion of Bhaba's concerns about Chinese capabilities and intentions, see Incoming
 Telegram, U.S. Department of State, November 14, 1964, available in file "Nuclear Proliferation:
 India-Pakistan," National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
 12. On this point, see Steven Hoffman, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California
 Press, 1990).
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 privileges in Tibet, inherited from the British colonial period, in 1952; and had
 championed China's entry into the United Nations (UN). Through these meas-
 ures Nehru had hoped to avoid a conflict with China, which he knew would
 compel him to increase defense spending. The border war forced Nehru to
 reappraise his strategy and his most cherished ideals.
 Phase Two: The Chinese Test at Lop Nor
 The second phase of India's nuclear program started shortly after the first
 Chinese nuclear test at Lop Nor on October 16, 1964.13 Following that test,
 segments of India's political and scientific establishments evinced a greater
 interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
 By this time Bhaba had begun to articulate the politico-military significance
 of nuclear weapons: "Nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery
 system can enable a State to destroy more or less totally the cities, industry,
 and all-important targets in another State. It is then largely irrelevant whether
 the State so attacked has greater destructive power at its command. With the
 help of nuclear weapons, therefore, a State can acquire what we may call a
 position of absolute deterrence even against another having a many times
 greater destructive power under its control."'14
 Bhaba's stance toward nuclear deterrence would find many adherents and
 some critics in India in the wake of the Chinese test. To no one's surprise, the
 news of the test released a firestorm of controversy across India. China's
 acquisition of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border
 war dealt a further blow to India's national security. Sisir Gupta, one of India's
 ablest diplomats, spelled out the concerns of most Indian strategists: ".
 without using its nuclear weapons and without unleashing the kind of war
 which would be regarded in the West as the crossing of the provocation-
 threshold, China may subject a non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail,
 weaken its people's spirit of resistance and self-confidence, and thus achieve
 without a war its major political and military objectives in Asia."15 Minoo
 Masani, a leader of the small, pro-Western Swatantra Party, expressed the fears
 of many of India's leaders: "The Chinese explosion cannot be ignored; it cannot
 13. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
 Press, 1988).
 14. H.J. Bhaba, "Safeguards and the Dissemination of Military Power," paper presented at the
 Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Geneva, January 27-February 1, 1964.
 15. Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma," in Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers?
 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 55-67, at p. 62.
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 be written off; it cannot be played down; it is of major significance. We are the
 country for which it has the most immediate importance."16
 Masani and other opposition members rebuked the government for not
 undertaking a more thorough review of the changed security situation on the
 subcontinent following the Chinese test and for not developing an appropriate
 response. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (the forerunner to the BJP) condemned
 India's policy of nuclear abstinence."7 Even normally progovernment newspa-
 pers questioned the leadership's seeming complacency in the wake of the
 Chinese nuclear tests.18
 Nehru, however, remained publicly opposed to the development of nuclear
 weapons. Nine days before his death, in a television interview in New York on
 May 18, 1964, he stated, "We are determined not to use weapons for war pur-
 poses. We do not make atom bombs. I do not think we will." 19 His defense mini-
 ster, YB. Chavan, however, felt compelled to reaffirm India's commitment to
 the modernization of its conventional forces in the wake of the Chinese test.20
 THE QUEST FOR A NUCLEAR GUARANTEE
 In December 1964 at a press conference in London, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur
 Shastri revealed India's efforts to obtain a nuclear guarantee from the nuclear
 weapons states.21 He pursued this course even though a number of Indian
 politicians, including some within the ruling Congress Party, feared that it
 would compromise their country's nonalignment stance.
 At the same time, political analysts with close connections to the government
 argued that India's credentials for boosting the nuclear disarmament agenda
 16. Quoted in Lok Sabha Debates 35, November 16-27, 1964 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat,
 1964), pp. 1239-1240.
 17. A representative sample is Eskayji (pseudonym), "Why India Must Have the Bomb," Organizer
 (India), December 28, 1964, p. 5.
 18. Editorial, "Time for Rethinking," Hindustan Standard (Delhi), October 20, 1964, p. 4.
 19. Quoted in G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services,
 1968), p. 23.
 20. "New Strategy on Defence: Impact of Chinese Atomic Test," Statesman (Calcutta), October 20,
 1964, p. 1; and Express News Service, "Chavan Urges a Look at the Bomb from Defence Angle:
 Chinese Threat Not Yet Over," Indian Express (Delhi), December 1, 1964, p. 1. See also Incoming
 Telegram, U.S. Department of State, October 27, 1968, available in file "Nuclear Proliferation:
 India-Pakistan," National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
 21. On the basis of the limited sources in the public domain, it appears that India's quest for a
 nuclear guarantee was poorly executed. It is hard to discern what exactly the Indian leadership
 had in mind when it sought to acquire such a guarantee from the great powers. For a discussion
 of India's attempts to obtain a nuclear guarantee, see A.G. Noorani, "India's Quest for a Nuclear
 Guarantee," Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 7 (July 1967), pp. 490-502.
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 could be strengthened if the country refrained from developing nuclear weap-
 ons even in the face of potential aggression by a nuclear-armed adversary.22
 These sentiments were first aired in a vigorous debate that took place at the
 All India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting between January 7 and 9, 1965.
 In the aftermath of the Chinese tests a number of Congress Party members of
 parliament favored dropping India's rigid stance on questions of disarmament.
 They forcefully and repeatedly called for a reorientation of India's foreign
 policy in light of the new perceived threat from China. However, the Congress
 leadership refused to address their central demand-a fundamental shift in
 India's nuclear policy-contending that the prohibitive costs of embarking on
 a nuclear weapons program, India's historic commitment to a nuclear-free
 world, its belief in Gandhian principles, and misgivings about alienating world
 opinion undermined the case for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons option.23
 In effect, the AICC chose to defer the question of acquiring nuclear weapons.24
 Interestingly, several individuals upbraided Homi Bhaba at this conference for
 a recent public statement in which he had spelled out the potential economic
 costs of developing a modest nuclear force for India.25
 These sentiments, which rallied against a drastic shift in India's security
 policy, were again expressed, despite continuing dissension, at the next meet-
 ing of the AICC, held on January 8, 1966.26 The arguments for rejecting the call
 to nuclear arms were made mostly along moral and ethical lines. One of the
 more prominent critics of nuclear weapons, senior Congress politician Morarji
 Desai, led the charge against the proponents of a shift in India's nuclear
 policies. Desai argued that India should not jettison its moral objections to
 nuclear weapons at the first sign of danger. At the same time, Prime Minister
 Shastri argued that the superpowers could not afford to be indifferent to India's
 plight in the face of a nuclear threat from China; however, he did not com-
 pletely forswear the nuclear option. Some evidence shows that Shastri allowed
 22. Some flavor of the strategic debate within India can be gathered from R.K. Nehru, "The
 Challenge of the Chinese Bomb," India Quarterly (1965), pp. 3-14.
 23. Shastri's concerns about the economic burden of pursuing a nuclear weapons program were
 entirely understandable: he had inherited an unenviable economy legacy. See Michael Brecher,
 Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 138-150.
 24. Thomas W. Graham, "Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control, and Confidence-Building Measures
 in South Asia," in Eric H. Arnett, ed., New Perspectives for a Changing World Order (Washington,
 D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1991), p. 127.
 25. Special Correspondent, "AICC Split on Atomic Issue," Statesman (Delhi), November 8, 1964,
 p. 1.
 26. K. Rangaswami, "Atom Bomb to Meet China's Threat: Vigorous Support in AICC for Inde-
 pendent Deterrent," Hindu (Madras), January 8, 1965, p. 3.
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 Bhaba to work toward reducing the time needed to develop nuclear explo-
 sives.27 He concluded that, for the present term, India should strengthen its
 conventional forces to defend itself against a possible Chinese attack.28
 Amid these debates, Shastri dispatched Sardar Swaran Singh, his foreign
 minister, to ascertain the views of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
 United Kingdom on India's request for a nuclear guarantee. Swaran Singh's
 initial assessment suggested that the requisite guarantees would materialize.
 Subsequently, however, during a debate on May 10, 1965, in the Lok Sabha
 (the lower house of the Indian parliament), he admitted that the nuclear
 weapons states had ultimately failed to provide any such guarantees.
 APPROACHES TO A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
 During this period the United States and the Soviet Union, exercised by the
 Chinese nuclear tests, sought to forge a multilateral treaty to stop the further
 spread of nuclear weapons.29 Accordingly, in November 1965 the UN Political
 Committee adopted a resolution detailing the guidelines for a treaty on nuclear
 nonproliferation. The Indian delegation to the UN had played a key role in
 drafting the central provisions of the text, which embodied two principles of
 special significance to India's concerns. First, the draft treaty specified a balance
 of mutual responsibilities and obligations on the part of the nuclear and
 nonnuclear powers. It offered the nonnuclear states access to peaceful nuclear
 technology in return for their agreement not to obtain or develop nuclear
 weapons. Second, the draft indicated that the attempts to promote nonprolif-
 eration would be merely a first step toward the ultimate goal of universal
 nuclear disarmament. As discussions on the proposed treaty progressed, India
 added another qualification: nonnuclear states should be able to carry out
 "peaceful nuclear explosions."30 The United States firmly opposed this last
 proposal on the grounds that no meaningful distinction could be made be-
 tween "peaceful" and "nonpeaceful" nuclear explosions.31 The various Indian
 27. Albert Wohlstetter, Victor Gilinsky, Robert Gillette, and Roberta Wohlstetter, Nuclear Policies:
 Fuel without the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1978), p. 58.
 28. See, for example, Express News Service, "The Bomb to Loom Large at AICC Meet," Indian
 Express (New Delhi), January 5, 1965, p. 4.
 29. John Simpson and Anthony G. McGrew, eds., The International Niuclear Non-Proliferation System:
 Challenges and Choices (New York: St. Martin's, 1984).
 30. Ashok Kapur, "India's Nuclear Politics and Policy: Janata Party's Evolving Stance," in T.T.
 Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978),
 p. 172.
 31. For a useful discussion, see Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 121-150.
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 delegations to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in
 Geneva in April and June 1965 nevertheless continued to press this distinc-
 tion.32 As the proposed treaty started to take shape, Indian diplomats outside
 the ambit of the ENDC again raised the question of nuclear guarantees for
 nonnuclear powers but to little avail.33
 THE 1965 INDO-PAKISTANI WAR
 A second Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir broke out, in September 1965.
 During this conflict China provided diplomatic support for Pakistan and
 threatened to open a second front along India's Himalayan border.34 Although
 this crude ultimatum was never carried out, Indian decisionmakers, still reel-
 ing from the debacle of 1962, took the Chinese warnings seriously and main-
 tained a high level of alert along the Himalayan border. The war ended in a
 stalemate. As the United States was unwilling to involve itself in promoting
 an Indo-Pakistani postwar accord, the Soviets stepped in, helping negotiate a
 settlement in January 1966 at the then-Soviet Central Asian city of Tashkent.
 Under the terms of the Tashkent agreement the two sides agreed to return to
 the status quo ante.
 Just before the war ended a hundred members of the Lok Sabha wrote to
 Prime Minister Shastri calling for India to exercise the nuclear weapons op-
 tion.35 Amid the growing public and political pressure, Shastri revealed a slight
 shift in the government's public pronouncements on nuclear weapons. The
 pressures confronting Shastri were genuine; India faced the possibility of a
 two-front war.
 While answering a question asked in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of
 the Indian parliament), Shastri stated that if the Chinese perfected their nuclear
 delivery systems India would be forced to reconsider its nuclear policies.36
 During this period India's apprehensions continued to mount as increasing
 evidence emerged about China's growing nuclear capabilities.37
 32. Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomnic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger,
 1976).
 33. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, p. 139.
 34. For a description and analysis of the three Indo-Pakistani wars, see Sumit Ganguly, The Origins
 of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994).
 35. "Time for A-Bomb-Say 100 M.P.'s," Indian Express, September 23, 1965, p. 1.
 36. Lal Bahadur Shastri, "If China Develops Nuclear Weapons India Will Have to Consider What
 to Do," India News (Washington, D.C.), December 3, 1965, p. 4.
 37. See, for example, Hanson W. Baldwin, "China's Atomic Potential," New York Times, March 15,
 1966, p. 3.
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 Shastri died in January 1966 shortly after negotiating the postwar accord
 with Pakistan. His successor, Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, continued the
 quest for a nuclear guarantee from the major powers against a future Chinese
 threat. To this end, she dispatched a distinguished senior bureaucrat, Laxmi
 Kant Jha, to Moscow and Washington, D.C., in April 1967 to discuss the
 possibility of a guarantee designed to deter a possible Chinese attack. Despite
 India's pleas the United States would only offer a guarantee that included
 significant qualifications. Among other matters, the guarantee would not have
 had the force of law because it would not be formally ratified by the U.S.
 Senate.38 The Soviets were even less forthcoming. At best, they were prepared
 to make a joint declaration under UN auspices not to employ nuclear weapons
 against nonnuclear powers.39 In the event, the qualified guarantees that both
 sides offered failed to satisfy India's requirements.
 BACK TO THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
 The discussions under way at the ENDC to formulate a nonproliferation treaty
 had a significant impact on India's disarmament and security plans. The
 country's earlier emphasis on the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament had
 been based upon fundamental moral premises. Now the terms of discourse at
 the international level shifted markedly. This movement was clearly reflected
 in the positions that India adopted at various multilateral forums. Three shifts
 were evident in India's negotiating stance: a reduced sense of urgency about
 the need for international agreements in disarmament matters, a withdrawal
 from an active role in international arms control negotiations, and the pur-
 suit of more traditional goals of statecraft (such as national security based
 upon military power, as opposed to reliance on the force of moral argu-
 ments).40
 38. Noorani, "India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee," pp. 498-499. Interestingly, U.S. government
 analysts not only were cognizant of the Chinese threat to India but also concurred that "the military
 security argument for an independent Indian nuclear deterrent to a Chinese attack is a particularly
 powerful one, given the looseness of India's collective security arrangements." See "Background
 Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear
 Weapons," SECRET/NOFORN Background Paper from the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation,
 January 21, 1965, available in file "Nuclear Proliferation: India and Pakistan," National Security
 Archive, Washington, D.C.
 39. Richard B. Freund, "Indian-Soviet Discussion of Nuclear Guarantees," Memorandum of Con-
 versation, February 16, 1965, available in file "Nuclear Proliferation: India and Pakistan," National
 Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
 40. Michael J. Sullivan, III, "Re-orientation of Indian Arms Control Policy, 1969-1971," paper
 presented at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association, Philadelphia,
 April 14, 1972.
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 When the major powers agreed on a draft treaty, India was quick to register
 its opposition. On January 18, 1968, the Soviet Union and the United States
 presented identical drafts of the treaty to the ENDC. Three of the great pow-
 ers-the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union-signed the
 treaty on July 1, 1968. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into
 force on March 5, 1970. The government of India refused to accede to the terms
 of the treaty because it failed to address India's misgivings; specifically, the
 continued nuclear abstinence of the nonnuclear states was not linked to explicit
 reciprocal obligations by the nuclear weapons states.41 Although India's argu-
 ment was couched in moral terms, a more pragmatic consideration-namely,
 keeping its nuclear weapons option open-guided its decision not to sign the
 treaty.42
 Phase Three: The Road to Pokhran I
 The third phase of India's nuclear program began with its first nuclear test, in
 May 1974. Both structural and proximate factors led up to this decision. The
 repeated failure of the great powers to address India's security concerns and
 the emergence of a different brand of political leadership within India caused
 important, if subtle, shifts in its nuclear policies. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,
 while repeating the platitudes of nonalignment, reoriented India's foreign
 policy, basing it less on adherence to moral principles and more on the impera-
 tives of statecraft. In place of her predecessors' carefully forged equidistance
 from the superpowers, she steadily tilted in a pro-Soviet direction, especially
 after significant policy differences with the United States arose in 1967 on trade,
 investment, and foreign aid issues.43 Furthermore, some Indian analysts argue
 that U.S. pressure on India during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War also convinced
 Indira Gandhi of the signal importance of developing India's military nuclear
 capabilities.44
 41. Sisir Gupta, "India and Non-Proliferation: Hard Choices Ahead," Timiies of India (Delhi), January
 29, 1968, p. 6.
 42. K. Subrahmanyam, "India: Keeping the Option Open," in Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus,
 eds., Nulclear Proliferation: Plhase II (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1973).
 43. For a discussion of the sources of discord, see Sumit Ganguly, "Of Great Expectations and
 Bitter Disappointments: Indo-U.S. Relations during the Johnson Administration," Asiani Affairs, Vol.
 15, No. 4 (Winter 1988-89), pp. 212-219. For an analysis of the pro-Soviet tilt, see Robert Horn,
 Soviet-Indian Relations: Issnes and Inlflluence (New York: Praeger, 1982).
 44. Subrahmanyam, "India: Keeping the Option Open."
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 While insisting upon India's adherence to the principles of nonalignment,
 Prime Minister Gandhi signed a twenty-year treaty of "peace, friendship, and
 cooperation" with the Soviet Union in August 1971. Article 9 of the treaty
 virtually included a Soviet security guarantee.45 Although the influence of this
 treaty is often overlooked in Western strategic analyses of India's security, it
 greatly assuaged India's fears about military pressures on its borders from a
 recalcitrant and nuclear-armed China.
 India's failure to influence the creation of a global regime that would address
 its security concerns pushed the country further down the nuclear path. Sub-
 sequent events bolstered the Indian elite's commitment to acquire nuclear
 weapons. In 1971 India and Pakistan became embroiled in a third war, which
 resulted in the breakup of the Pakistani state and the emergence of Bangladesh
 in place of the former East Pakistan. In the aftermath of this war India emerged
 as the preeminent power on the subcontinent.
 In the interim, after Homi Bhaba's death in 1966, his successor, Vikram
 Sarabhai, continued to broaden India's nuclear infrastructure.46 On May 25,
 1970, Sarabhai in a public document spelled out the key features and goals of
 India's nuclear and space programs for the coming decade. Specifically, the
 document called for important developments in the arena of space research,
 including a commitment to develop rocket systems capable of placing 1,200-
 kilogram payloads into geosynchronous orbit, the development of flight gui-
 dance systems for rockets, and the construction of large solid-propellant
 blocks.47 The discovery of uranium deposits in northern India had also helped
 boost India's nuclear programs.48
 Thus at the start of the 1970s India had both the capability and the political
 motivation to conduct a nuclear test. The only question that remained about
 weaponization was the political decision to proceed based upon some assess-
 ment of the likely external costs of such a test. In an effort to bolster India's
 45. For an analysis of the significance of this article, see Linda Racioppi, Soviet Policy towards Souith
 Asia since 1970 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
 46. For a discussion of India's weapons-making capabilities, see Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's
 Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72. For a
 more skeptical view of India's nuclear infrastructure, see Ravindra Tomar, "The Indian Nuclear
 Power Program: Myths and Mirages," Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 5 (May 1980), pp. 517-531.
 47. Vikram Sarabhai, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: A Design for Decade 1970-80," Insti-
 tute of Defence Studies and Analysis Journal (Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 1 (July 1970), pp. 90-91.
 48. David Gosling, "India on Way to Nuclear Independence," Statesman (New Delhi), November
 23, 1971, p. 8.
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 newfound political status in South Asia after its victory in the 1971 war, Indira
 Gandhi authorized a nuclear test. The precise timing of the test, however, had
 much to do with her sagging domestic popularity in the aftermath of the 1973
 oil crisis induced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
 THE FIRST NUCLEAR TEST
 India carried out its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974. Billed as a "peaceful
 nuclear explosion," the test had a 15-kiloton yield.49 Subsequently, Defense
 Minister Jagjivan Ram argued that the test had few or no military implications
 and was simply part of India's ongoing attempts to harness the peaceful uses
 of nuclear energy.50 The two scientists closely associated with the nuclear test,
 R. Chidambaram and R. Ramanna, maintained the same public posture.51
 India's explanation of the test found few adherents abroad, however. Of the
 great powers, only France congratulated the Indians on their success.52 The
 Chinese and Soviet reactions were muted, but critical. The United States and
 Canada cut off all nuclear cooperation with India. Canada accused India of
 having diverted nuclear materials from a Canadian-supplied reactor to make
 the bomb.53 The U.S. reaction, however, was the most severe: in 1976 Congress
 introduced the Symington amendment to the foreign aid bill, thereby cutting
 off certain forms of economic and military assistance to countries that received
 enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology without full-
 scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.54 Further restrictions
 soon followed under the Carter administration, which had made nonprolifera-
 tion one of the key elements of its foreign policy platform. Most important, the
 Carter administration introduced and passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation
 Act, omnibus legislation designed to severely curb nuclear sales to recalcitrant
 nations.55 The United States also undertook significant efforts to limit prolif-
 49. The slightest doubt of the military significance of the test was effectively ruled out in October
 1997 when Raja Ramanna, one of the key scientists involved in conducting the test, explicitly stated
 that the 1974 test was that of a nuclear weapon. See Adirupa Sengupta, "Scientist Says Bomb Was
 Tested in '74," India Abroad, October 17, 1997, p. 14.
 50. On this point, see "Indian Rules Out Atomic Arms' Use," New York Times, May 23, 1974, p. 5.
 51. R. Chidambaram and R. Ramanna, "Some Studies on India's Peaceful Nuclear Experiment,"
 Peaceflil Nuclear Explosions IV (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1975).
 52. "New Delhi Assailed at Parley in Geneva for Atom Explosion," Nezv York Times, May 22, 1974,
 p. 3.
 53. Robert Trumbull, "Canada Says India's Blast Violated Use of Atom Aid," Nezv York Times, May
 21, 1974, p. 4.
 54. Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S.-Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Orient Longman,
 1993), pp. 74-75.
 55. For a detailed discussion, see ibid., pp. 56-66.
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 eration at the multilateral level, taking the lead in the formation of the London
 Suppliers Group, which sought to coordinate and limit the sales of sensitive
 and dual-use technologies to countries outside the ambit of the NPT.
 The raft of legislation that the U.S. Congress passed after the Indian nuclear
 test significantly hobbled India's ability to further its nuclear weapons pro-
 gram. The sharpness of international reactions and the variety of nuclear
 export restrictions that the major industrial powers placed on India came as a
 surprise to the Indian political elite. This body of restrictive legislation also had
 a perverse and unintended consequence, however: it made the Indian program
 increasingly indigenous.
 Despite the initial wave of domestic support following the test, pressing
 internal concerns diverted the public's attention from the pursuit of a nuclear
 weapons option. In fact, within two years of the test Indira Gandhi had
 declared a "state of emergency" to avoid prosecution for a number of minor
 electoral violations. With her personal political survival at stake, she could ill
 afford to devote significant time and resources to the nuclear question.
 Phase Four: A Period of Restraint
 The next stage in India's nuclear program was marked by little progress in
 attaining nuclear weapons status, even though there was increasing public and
 military (and even some political) support for acquiring nuclear weapons. Two
 factors explain this restraint. At one level, Indira Gandhi had taken stock of
 the adverse international reactions to India's nuclear test. At another level, a
 robust Indo-Soviet strategic relationship assuaged India's security concerns.
 In 1977 Indira Gandhi ended the state of emergency and called for fresh
 national elections. Her sycophantic advisers convinced her that she would win
 by a wide margin at the polls. Their expectations were completely belied when
 the Indian electorate turned against her and the Congress Party. An eclectic
 collection of political parties and leaders who had been opposed to the draco-
 nian features of the state of emergency, when personal rights and civil liberties
 had been dramatically curtailed, formed a coalition government.56 Morarji
 Desai, a senior Gandhian and former Congress politician, assumed the prime
 ministership. Long an opponent of nuclear weapons, primarily on moral
 grounds, Desai reversed the direction of Indian nuclear planning. He even
 56. For a discussion of the "state of emergency," see Henry Hart, ed., Indira Ganldhi's Inldia: A
 Political System Re-Appraised (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978).
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 derided the potential scientific or technological benefits of "peaceful nuclear
 explosions" and publicly pledged that under his regime India would not
 conduct nuclear tests.57
 Desai's term in office lasted only until July 1979. His anti-Congress coalition
 split amid conflicting ideologies and personal predilections. The caretaker
 regime of Prime Minister Charan Singh altered Desai's ironclad commitment
 not to acquire nuclear weapons, holding that the decision was a sovereign
 Indian prerogative. Many in New Delhi also believed that the incoming Con-
 gress government would reverse Desai's policy.58 In January 1980, when new
 national elections were held, Indira Gandhi and the Congress Party returned
 with a significant majority.
 THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN
 The Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan in late December 1979 had
 important ramifications for the security of South Asia. In particular, the result-
 ing transformation of U.S.-Pakistani relations was nothing short of dramatic.
 Under the Carter administration Pakistan had been scorned because of its poor
 human rights record and its clandestine quest to acquire nuclear weapons.
 Following the Soviet invasion, the Carter administration's offers of a limited
 arms and economic assistance package to Pakistan were dismissed by General
 Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, the Pakistani military dictator, as "peanuts." In the
 Reagan administration, Pakistan's relations with the United States entered new
 territory.
 General Zia managed to turn the potentially destabilizing civil war across
 the Afghan border to his advantage, becoming the beneficiary of significant
 American largesse in the process. Specifically, the Reagan administration of-
 fered his regime a package of concessionary loans and grant aid totaling $3.2
 billion over five years. In return, the Pakistani regime was to give the Central
 Intelligence Agency a largely unrestricted hand in organizing, training, and
 arming the Afghan resistance. In addition, to assuage Pakistani fears of Indo-
 Soviet collusion, the Reagan administration agreed to sell Pakistan several
 squadrons of F-16 fighter jets.
 57. On this issue, see Prime Minister Morarji Desai, "Statement on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions,"
 Rajya Sabha, July 31, 1978, Official Text (New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, Government of
 India).
 58. Mohan Ram, "The South Asian Arms Race," Far Eastern Economic Reviewv, November 16, 1979,
 pp. 38-39. For an analysis of the mounting pressures on the Indira Gandhi regime to weaponize,
 see Rajiv Desai, "Nuclear Shadow on Subcontinent," Chicago Tribune, August 17, 1981, p. 21.
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 India, as expected, vehemently lobbied against the sale of the F-16s to
 Pakistan, but with little success. Unhappy with the potential transformation of
 the South Asian security situation, India turned to the Soviet Union for military
 assistance.59 The Soviets were extraordinarily forthcoming in providing arms
 at concessional rates, but at another price: India had to refrain from publicly
 criticizing the Soviet invasion and abstain from the UN General Assembly
 resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.
 As the arms transfer relationship between the United States and Pakistan
 was renewed and India's conventional military superiority eroded, the clamor
 for India to exercise the nuclear weapons option resumed. Prominent newspa-
 per commentators and security analysts argued that India needed to have a
 nuclear edge over Pakistan to cope with the emerging security situation in the
 region. The earlier preoccupation with Chinese nuclear capabilities was redi-
 rected toward Pakistan's growing nuclear status. The argument ran along the
 following lines: the United States, with full knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear
 ambitions, was nevertheless supplying Pakistan with sophisticated weaponry
 and potentially nuclear-capable aircraft. Growing evidence of Chinese collu-
 sion in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program fueled Indian concerns.60 Un-
 der these changed security circumstances India had to reevaluate its nuclear
 policies.61
 ACQUIRING GREATER CAPABILITIES
 In the early 1980s the clamor for the acquisition of a nuclear option grew as,
 ironically, U.S. sources increasingly provided evidence of Pakistan's quest for
 nuclear weapons and the Chinese supply of a nuclear weapons design to
 Pakistan.62 India's bomb-making capabilities also expanded during this pe-
 riod.63 Specifically, in February 1983 reports surfaced of India's ability to re-
 process plutonium to weapons grade.64 Also in 1983 the Defense Research and
 Development Organization (DRDO) was given increased funding and a new
 59. For a discussion of the Soviet willingness to transfer advanced weaponry to India, see G.S.
 Bhargava, Souith Asin after Afghanaistan (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983).
 60. William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
 61. See, for example, Jonathan Power; "Mrs. Gandhi's Nuclear Nuances," Initerlnatioinal Henald
 Tribunte, December 18, 1981, p. 5.
 62. K. Subrahrmaiyam, "Pak Bomb in Basement," Timies of Inidia, November 7, 1986, p. 5.
 63. Suman Dubey, "India, Keeping Its Nuclear Options Open, Monitors Arms Program in Neigh-
 boring Pakistan with Concern," Wall Street Jolrnal, November 26, 1984, p. 36.
 64. Clyde H. Farnsworth, "India Now Producing Plutonium of Arms Grade at Bombay Plant,"
 Nezv York Tim1es, February 21, 1983, p. 7.
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 mandate, the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP).65 A
 space scientist, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who had previously worked for the civilian
 Indian Space Research Organization, was shifted to the DRDO and placed in
 charge of the IGMDP.66 Kalam's transfer to the military component of India's
 rocketry program was significant, because he had a personal passion for the
 development of indigenous ballistic missile technology.67 Indira Gandhi's faith
 in Kalam's ability was not misplaced. Under his leadership the DRDO devel-
 oped and successfully test-fired India's first intermediate-range ballistic missile,
 the Agni (the name literally means "fire") on May 22, 1989, from a test range
 at Chandipore in the eastern coastal state of Orissa. Since then, the DRDO has
 developed a panoply of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.68
 In the wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination in October 1984, her son, Rajiv
 Gandhi, assumed the prime ministership. During Rajiv's tenure in office India
 pursued contradictory policies on the nuclear question.69 On the one hand, he
 proposed a comprehensive plan for the gradual elimination of nuclear weap-
 ons, popularly referred to as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. This plan, which
 he presented in an address to the UN General Assembly, called for the elimi-
 nation of all nuclear arsenals by the year 2010. It spelled out particular stages
 and targets that were to be achieved by all nuclear weapons states and imposed
 reciprocal restrictions on all nuclear-threshold powers.70 It is not entirely clear
 whether this proposal was merely symbolic or whether it represented a serious
 effort by the government to reclaim its Nehruvian roots. In the event, the great
 powers showed scant attention to the proposal. Also during Rajiv's term, India
 and Pakistan reached an accord not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.71
 This treaty was not formally ratified, however, until 1991.
 65. Significantly, these changes came about when allegations of Chinese nuclear assistance to
 Pakistan had gathered steam.
 66. Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford
 University Press, 1991), p. 201; and Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, pp. 372-373.
 67. On this point, see Sunil Dasgupta, "A Quiet Launch," India Today International, June 30, 1994,
 p. 93.
 68. Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal, pp. 199-203.
 69. A particularly thoughtful discussion of the contradictions in India's declaratory nuclear weapons
 policy can be found in Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The Nuclear Option: Ambivalent Stand," India Today
 International, May 31, 1985, p. 47. See also K. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Nuclear Policy, 1964-1998:
 A Personal Recollection," in Jasjit Singh, ed., Nuiclear India (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998),
 pp. 26-53.
 70. Rajiv Gandhi, "Address to the Third Special Session on Disarmament," United Nations General
 Assembly, New York, June 9, 1988.
 71. Steve Coll, "India, Pakistan Pursue Peace by Creating Nuclear Standoff," Washington Post,
 December 29, 1990, p. A13.
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 On the other hand, despite this renewed attempt at multilateral diplomacy
 and some movement on the bilateral front with Pakistan, the scientific-military
 establishment received a considerable boost under Rajiv. A newspaper account
 based upon a conversation with M.R. Srinavasan, the chairman of the AEC and
 a prominent Indian antinuclear activist, confirmed that India had made sub-
 stantial progress toward the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Specifi-
 cally, the report stated that India had stockpiled between 100 and 200 kilograms
 of plutonium, sufficient to build between twelve and forty weapons.72
 Furthermore, a belated realization that hortatory efforts toward encouraging
 multilateral disarmament were next to meaningless influenced Rajiv's decision
 to boost India's nuclear capabilities. K. Subrahmanyam, a key participant in
 many of the critical decisions of India's nuclear weapons policy, argues along
 these lines in a work published shortly after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests.
 According to Subrahmanyam, it was under Rajiv Gandhi that India made the
 decision to acquire the missiles and other technology to form an effective
 nuclear deterrent.73
 Rajiv's interest in India's military modernization may have also contributed
 to South Asia's first nuclear crisis in 1987, in the wake of a major military
 exercise code-named "Brasstacks."74 The precise dimensions of the nuclear
 component of this crisis remain somewhat murky.75 It is known, however, that
 toward the end of the crisis, in late January 1987, Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely
 known as the "father" of the Pakistani nuclear program, gave an interview to
 a prominent Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar. In this interview, Khan made
 clear to Nayar that Pakistan had succeeded in producing weapons-grade ura-
 nium. 76 There is little or no question that the Indian political leadership took
 Khan's claim about uranium enrichment seriously.
 THE 1990 CRISIS
 Within three years India became embroiled in another crisis with Pakistan-
 one with an obvious nuclear dimension. This crisis, unlike the 1987 Brasstacks
 72. Steven R. Weisman, "India's Nuclear Energy Policy Raises New Doubts on Arms," New York
 Times, May 7,1988, p. 1.
 73. Subrahmanyam, "Indian Nuclear Policy, 1964-1998," p. 44.
 74. For a detailed description and analysis of the Brasstacks crisis, see Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari,
 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and
 the Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994).
 75. See Lawrence Lifshultz, "Doom Thy Neighbour," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1998,
 pp. 30-34.
 76. Steven R. Weisman, "Pakistan Stiffens on Atomic Program," New York Times, March 22, 1987,
 p. A4.
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 crisis, stemmed directly from the outbreak of a secessionist, ethnoreligious
 insurgency in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.77 Soon Pakistani
 infiltrators began crossing the porous border to join forces with the Kashmiri
 insurgents.78 The dramatic rise in the incidence of violence within the Kashmir
 valley, the principal locus of the insurgency, is widely believed to have led
 Indian decisionmakers to consider deep strikes into Pakistani territory to
 destroy insurgent training camps and sanctuaries. Pakistani intelligence
 sources, it is asserted, learned of India's plans and, fearing a wider invasion,
 placed key portions of the Pakistani air force on alert. Pakistani decisionmakers
 also allegedly considered resorting to the use of nuclear weapons in the event
 of a concerted Indian incursion into Pakistan's heartland.79 As the crisis peaked
 in May 1990, on the basis of reports from U.S. intelligence agencies, President
 George Bush sent Robert Gates, the deputy national security adviser, to India
 and Pakistan. In New Delhi Gates counseled restraint. In Islamabad he warned
 Pakistani decisionmakers that in every war-game scenario that the Pentagon
 had developed, Pakistan emerged as the loser. Consequently, he argued, it was
 not in Pakistan's interest to provoke India.80
 In October President Bush invoked the Pressler amendment to the Foreign
 Assistance Act, stating that he could not certify to Congress that Pakistan did
 not possess a nuclear explosive device.81 This conclusion led to a cutoff of the
 substantial U.S. economic and military assistance that had been flowing to
 Pakistan since the beginning of the civil war in Afghanistan.82 Despite the
 77. Sumit Ganguly, "Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay: Explaining the Crisis in Kash-
 mir," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 76-107.
 78. On Pakistan's involvement in the insurgency, see Edward Desmond, "Pakistan's Hidden
 Hand," Time, July 22, 1991, p. 23; and John Ward Anderson and Kamran Khan, "Pakistan Shelters
 Islamic Radicals," Washington Post, March 8,1995, pp. A21-A22.
 79. It is not entirely clear whether the Pakistani air force squadrons were equipped with nuclear
 weapons. The initial tocsin was sounded by Seymour Hersh in "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker,
 March 29, 1993, pp. 56-73. For a more temperate analysis of the crisis, see Stephen P. Cohen, "1990:
 South Asia's Useful Nuclear Crisis," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
 Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, February 6-7, 1992, pp. 2-10. See also
 Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruqee, eds., Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in
 South Asia: The 1990 Crisis, Occasional Paper No. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center,
 April 1994).
 80. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington,
 D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).
 81. The amendment, formally known as the International Security and Development Cooperation
 Act of 1985, required the president of the United States to certify that Pakistan did not possess a
 nuclear device.
 82. Michael R. Gordon, "Nuclear Issue Slows U.S. Aid to Pakistan," New York Times, October 1,
 1990, p. A3.
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 cessation of aid the Pakistani nuclear program proceeded apace, and the
 Chinese continued to support Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.83
 Within the next two years Pakistani political leaders as well as diplomats
 openly confirmed that Pakistan had acquired the ability to manufacture a
 nuclear bomb.84 These developments were carefully noted in New Delhi.
 Phase Five: The Collapse of the Security Guarantee
 The final phase of the Indian nuclear program started in the aftermath of the
 Soviet collapse in 1991, which had profound implications for India's security
 and foreign policies. It meant the loss of the support of a veto-wielding power
 in the UN on the critical question of Kashmir. It also brought to an end a highly
 favorable arms-transfer relationship. But most important, from the standpoint
 of Indian security, it resulted in the loss of a critical counterweight to the
 Chinese threat: the security guarantee implied in the 1971 treaty with the
 Soviet Union disintegrated with the Soviet collapse; Russia is now too debili-
 tated to provide much reassurance to India.
 THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RENEWAL
 In 1995 the NPT came up for its twenty-five-year review. The United States,
 one of the principal proponents of the NPT regime, sought an "unconditional
 and indefinite extension" of the treaty. India, which had chosen to stay outside
 the NPT regime, decided not to participate in the proceedings in New York
 during April-May 1995 and did not even seek observer status.85 The Indian
 hope was that the United States would fail to cobble together a coalition that
 would unconditionally and indefinitely extend the treaty. Such expectations
 and fears were belied, as able and relentless American diplomacy ensured the
 achievement of the U.S. goal.86 After the treaty was extended, only India,
 Pakistan, and Israel remained outside its scope. The U.S. success came as a
 83. Steven A. Holmes, "China Denies Violating Pact by Selling Arms to Pakistan," New York Times,
 July 26, 1993, p. 6.
 84. Stefan Wagstyl, "A Damaging Diversion," Financial Times, August 26, 1994, p. 7.
 85. India's reservations about the NPT regime can be found in Rakesh Sood, "The NPT and
 Beyond," paper presented at a seminar entitled "Non-Proliferation and Technology Transfer,"
 University of Pennsylvania, October 3-6, 1993, pp. 1-20. In this paper, Sood, the director of the
 Disarmament and International Security Division of India's Ministry of External Affairs, traces
 some of the early history of the NPT negotiations and discusses the possibilities of expanding the
 scope of the regime to address India's concerns.
 86. Lewis A. Dunn, "High Noon for the NPT," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 6 (July/August
 1995), pp. 3-9.
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 dramatic shock to the Indian security policy establishment, which now realized
 that India would come under acute pressure to sign the NPT or at least to
 agree to full-scope safeguards on its nuclear power plants, including those of
 indigenous origin.
 THE BROWN AMENDMENT
 In the fall of 1995 the Clinton administration sought to obtain some leverage
 over Pakistan to contain its quest for nuclear weapons. Specifically, the admin-
 istration, in concert with Senator Hank Brown (R-Colo.), introduced legislation
 designed to override the provisions of the Pressler amendment. The Brown
 amendment allowed the provision of economic and some military assistance
 to Pakistan without any attached conditions. Despite vigorous opposition from
 senators committed to nonproliferation, the amended bill passed.87
 THE "NEAR TEST"
 The extension of the NPT and the passage of the Brown amendment, which
 led to a renewal of up to $368 million in U.S. military assistance to Pakistan,
 inevitably provoked Indian security concerns.88 At one level, the Indian lead-
 ership under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao feared, justifiably or not, that the
 renewal of American arms transfers to Pakistan would lead to a larger U.S.
 security relationship with Pakistan. On another level the Indians were anxious
 about the pressures that would be brought upon them in the wake of the
 extension of the NPT. Additionally, moves toward the finalization of the Com-
 prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were also under way at the United Nations
 Disarmament Conference (UNDC) in Geneva. It is reasonable to infer that the
 Indian government believed that its window of opportunity was rapidly clos-
 ing. It is in this politico-strategic context that Prime Minister Rao permitted the
 preparations for carrying out a nuclear test in December 1995.89 The test was
 stymied when U.S. reconnaissance satellites picked up signs of activity at the
 test site and, in response, the U.S. ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, prevailed
 upon the infamously indecisive prime minister to call off the tests.90
 87. Elaine Sciolino, "Despite Nuclear Fears, Senate Acts to Lift Pakistan Curbs," Nezv York Times,
 September 22, 1995, p. 4.
 88. Aziz Haniffa, "Arms for Pakistan Near Passage; India Hurt," India Abroad, November 3, 1995,
 p. 14.
 89. The Indian "near test" of December 1995 decisively shows the fallacy of the "domestic
 imperatives" argument for the Indian tests of 1998. Obviously, the 1998 tests briefly boosted the
 BJP's domestic ratings. Larger security concerns propelled the BJP, however, just as they had driven
 the Narasimha Rao regime less than two years earlier.
 90. Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian, "Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Prepara-
 tions in the Rajasthan Desert," Science and Global Society (1996), pp. 101-189. Some allegations also
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 THE CTBT LOOMS
 In 1996, following two years of extensive negotiations, the CTBT process
 gathered steam in Geneva.91 Although India had been one of the principal
 sponsors of the treaty in its initial form, it had three objections to the treaty as
 negotiated in Geneva. First, the Indians insisted that they would accede to the
 treaty only if the nuclear weapons states agreed to a time-bound plan for
 universal nuclear disarmament. For the most part, this position was little more
 than a ploy; Indian policymakers knew only too well that none of the nuclear
 weapons states would agree to this proposition. Consequently, the inevitable
 failure to include such a time-bound objective would give India the option to
 remain outside the treaty.
 The second objection stemmed from the demand of some states that the
 treaty could come into force only after forty-four countries that had ongoing
 nuclear research and power facilities ratified the treaty. Again, although the
 argument against the "entry into force" clause was questioned on the grounds
 of fairness, India's interest in challenging the clause was purely pragmatic. As
 a state with an ongoing but largely untested nuclear weapons program, India
 would come under enormous pressure to accede to the CTBT.92
 The third Indian objection was more substantive:93 it dealt with the treaty's
 allowance of computer simulations of nuclear tests and hydronuclear tests. In
 the Indian view, the failure to close these two technological loopholes under-
 mined the larger goal of taking steps toward the elimination of nuclear weap-
 ons. In the end, India could not block the reporting of the treaty from the
 UNDC to the General Assembly in New York.94 Its efforts to modify the treaty
 text or to prevent its adoption by the General Assembly also proved fruitless.
 The treaty was passed on September 10, 1996, by an overwhelming majority
 of the member states.95
 suggest that India toyed with another nuclear explosion in early 1982. On this issue, see Shubhar-
 rata Bhattacharya, "Another Nuclear Blast at Pokhran?" Sunday (Calcutta), May 12, 1982, pp. 12-14.
 91. For an analysis of India's negotiating stances at the UNDC, see C. Raja Mohan, "India and the
 CTBT: Time to Quit," Hindu, June 10, 1996, p. 11. For discussions of subsequent developments, see
 John F. Burns, "Old Foe of Atom Arms, India Now Blocks Test Ban," New York Times, August 17,
 1996, p. 2; and Barbara Crossette, "India Vetoes Pact to Forbid Testing of Nuclear Weapons," New
 York Times, August 21, 1996, p. Al.
 92. Stephen W. Young, "A Test Ban Treaty That Doesn't Ban Tests," BASIC Reports (Washington,
 D.C.: British-American Security Information Council, September 23, 1996), pp. 1-2.
 93. K. Subrahmanyam, "The CTBT Puzzle," Economic Times (Bombay), June 8, 1996, p. 5.
 94. Tarun Basu, "Nation Ignores Veiled Threats, Blocks CTBT," India Abroad, August 23, 1996, p. 4.
 95. Jim Wurst, "Comprehensive Test Ban Overwhelmingly Adopted," Disarmament Times (New
 York, September 20, 1996), p. 1. The treaty passed with 158 votes in support, 3 opposed, and 5
 abstentions.
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 Two factors explain the Indian shift from support to rejection of the CTBT.
 At one level, as has already been discussed, the Indians were acutely concerned
 about the "entry into force" clause and the likely effects of this upon their
 nuclear weapons program. The other concern dealt with the spate of Chinese
 nuclear tests just prior to China's accession to the CTBT. The Indian strategic
 community correctly inferred that the Chinese were willing to accede to the
 treaty only because they had reached such a level of competence in their
 weapons development that they felt no need to test further.96
 RETURNING TO POKHRAN
 The years 1997-98 proved momentous for India in terms of its domestic
 politics. Within the span of one year three different governments ruled the
 country.97 With the collapse of the shaky United Front coalition government in
 December 1997, new national elections were called for February-March 1998.
 In these elections, the BJP emerged as the largest single party within parliament
 and, with the support of a number of regional parties, it assumed power.
 The BJP's election manifesto had spoken of the perceived need to "induct"
 nuclear weapons into India's arsenal along with a "strategic review" of India's
 security environment. Most Western analysts, however, had dismissed the
 BJP's electoral promise as bluff and bluster meant for domestic political con-
 sumption.98 Yet a more careful perusal of the BJP's public stance toward
 perceived security threats from Pakistan and China, as well as its position on
 defense spending and nuclear weapons, should have suggested otherwise.99
 Given the BJP's hawkish proclivities and the substantial scientific, military,
 and public support for the nuclear program, only a triggering event was
 necessary to propel the BJP to break from India's long-standing policy of
 nuclear abstinence.
 This trigger came in the form of Pakistan's test of an intermediate-range
 ballistic missile, code-named Ghauri, on April 6, 1998. The Ghauri, built with
 either Chinese or North Korean technology, has a range of 1,500 kilometers
 and can carry a payload of 750 kilograms. Its range would enable Pakistan to
 96. Seth Faison, "China Sets Off Nuclear Test, Then Announces Moratorium," New York Times, July
 30, 1996, p. 4; and Sanjay Suri, "Chinese Test Seen behind Indian CTBT Stand," India Abroad,
 August 23, 1996, p. 8.
 97. Sumit Ganguly, "India in 1997: Another Year of Turmoil," Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 2 (February
 1998), pp. 126-134.
 98. Tim Weiner, "Every Nation's Just Another U.S.," New York Times, June 7, 1998, p. 5.
 99. See the section entitled "Our Nation's Security," in the BJP's 1998 election manifesto,
 http://bjp.org.
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 target twenty-six cities in India.100 This new Pakistani capability reinforced
 prior perceptions in India about the deterioration of India's immediate security
 environment. For example, in 1997 even under the United Front government,
 the Ministry of Defense's annual report had expressed considerable misgivings
 about China's support for Pakistan's nuclear and ballistic missile programs as
 well as China's own growing ballistic missile capabilities.101 Any remaining
 qualms about the wisdom of carrying out nuclear tests were set aside in the
 aftermath of the Ghauri test. Between May 9 and 10, 1998, Prime Minister Atal
 Behari Vajpayee informed key ministers and the highest-ranking bureaucrats
 as well as the three service chiefs of his decision to proceed with the nuclear
 tests.102
 It is tempting to argue that a different Indian regime would not have acted
 with similar alacrity to the Ghauri test. To this question there can be no
 definitive answer. It is well known, however, that several previous govern-
 ments had made careful preparations for a nuclear test. In fact, had U.S.
 reconnaissance satellites not discovered India's nuclear test preparations, it is
 likely that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao would have given the word to
 proceed in 1995.
 Explanations of India's Nuclear Behavior
 Three factors drove India's decision to test it nuclear weapons in 1998. The first
 was the incremental and fitful acquisition of the capability to manufacture
 nuclear weapons. This process was haphazard, discontinuous, and ridden with
 setbacks. Nevertheless, from the outset of the civilian nuclear program, Homi
 100. A debate has arisen about the precise sources of the technology used in the manufacture of
 the Ghauri. Some argue that it is of Chinese origin. Others contend that it is based on North Korean
 technology. Muhammad Najeeb, "After Ghauri, It Is Long-Range Ghaznavi's Turn," India Abroad,
 April 24, 1998, p. 18; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "India: The Nuclear Politics of Self-Esteem," Current
 History, Vol. 97, No. 623 (December 1998), pp. 403-406; and Tim Weiner, "U.S. and China Helped
 Pakistan Build Its Bomb," New York Times, June 1, 1998, p. A6. For a detailed discussion and analysis
 of the Chinese role in supporting Pakistan's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, see Nayan
 Chanda et al., "The Race Is On," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 11, 1998, pp. 20-22.
 101. Ministry of Defense, Annual Report, 1996-1997 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1997). See
 also International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1997-98 (London:
 Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 164.
 102. One could well ask why the BJP did not simply declare India to be a nuclear weapons state
 without actually testing five nuclear devices. Two plausible answers can be suggested. First, India's
 nuclear weapons establishment would not feel that they possessed the requisite confidence in their
 weapons designs short of a series of tests. Second, if the press reports are accurate, one of the
 devices tested was thermonuclear. A thermonuclear device requires a nuclear triggering device.
 See Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Shock Waves," India Today, May 25, 1998, pp. 12-20.
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 Bhaba harbored aspirations to make India a nuclear weapons state. His suc-
 cessors moved the program along to varying degrees, depending on their
 personal predilections and based upon political directions from New Delhi.
 Second, the fitful movement toward a nuclear weapons capacity closely
 followed the shifting calculations of Indian leaders, who responded to a mix
 of ideology (initially a force for restraint), statecraft, and domestic pressures
 reflecting security concerns.103 The evolution of the nuclear program and the
 1998 tests were the product of calculated political choices based upon consid-
 erations of national security. Certain regimes and specific political leaders
 brought definite ideas about India's national security needs to office and acted
 upon those beliefs and assumptions. In large part, decisions, sometimes secret
 or subtle, made by Indian prime ministers advanced the nuclear weapons
 program without a full-fledged commitment to develop weapons.
 The third factor was the perception of external security threats and the
 absence of security guarantees from friendly nuclear states. Perceived threats
 from China and Pakistan repeatedly accelerated the program, with the period
 of the Soviet security guarantee providing an interlude.
 Many foreign and several Indian political commentators have dismissed the
 security imperatives underlying the Indian nuclear weapons program as well
 as the Indian tests, while privileging other explanations based on considera-
 tions of status, prestige, and the short-term exigencies of domestic politics.104
 Worse still, much of the conventional wisdom dismisses India's felt security
 needs and blithely asserts that India would be better off without nuclear
 weapons. The purveyors of this perspective, with important exceptions, had
 evinced little or no interest in India's security concerns prior to the nuclear
 103. Ideological beliefs, on occasion, acted as forces for restraint. For example, Prime Minister
 Morarji Desai, a staunch Gandhian, opposed India's development of nuclear weapons. The BJP-led
 government that came to power in March 1998, however, included a number of individuals who
 believed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was critical to India's security. On Desai's beliefs,
 see Kapur, India's Nuiclear Option.
 104. For an Indian feminist critique of the tests, see Madhu Kishwar, "BJP's Wargasm," Manushi
 (New Delhi), No. 106 (May-June 1998) available at <<http://www.arbornet.org:81/
 -radhika/manushi/issuelO6/wargasm.html>>. For other dissenting voices from India, see Vinod
 Mehta, "How a 'Tired' PM Became a 'Bold' PM," Outlook (New Delhi), June 8, 1998, pp. 28-29. For
 an extraordinarily shallow American analysis of the dynamics of Indian politics ridden with factual
 errors, see Peter Beinart, "The Return of the Bomb," New Republic, August 3, 1998, pp. 22-27. In
 this article, for example, the author asserts that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao attempted to revive
 secularism in India. In fact, he did nothing of the sort. It was during his tenure in office that Hindu
 fanatics destroyed the Babri mosque in Uttar Pradesh on December 6, 1992. Rao also did little to
 control the anti-Muslim rioting that followed in the wake of the mosque's destruction.
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 tests.105 Yet ample evidence suggests that India's security misgivings did play
 an important role in the evolution of the program as well as in precipitating
 the nuclear tests of May 1998.
 Indeed, most of the explanations proffered to date for the tests are inade-
 quate in part because they disregard one or more of the fundamental elements
 I have discussed. One argument suggests that the decision to carry out the
 tests can be directly attributed to the rise of the BJP to dominance in India's
 government in March 1998.106 The argument holds that the BJP leaders, many
 of whom are virulently anti-Pakistani, wish to craft a strong, virile India to
 dominate the subcontinent. The demonstration of India's nuclear capability
 would send a message of India's enormous military power and prowess to its
 long-term adversary and recalcitrant neighbor and, in turn, would instill a
 degree of Pakistani restraint on the nettlesome Kashmir dispute. This argument
 has some merit but is nevertheless inadequate. Segments of the BJP leadership
 do have a profoundly chauvinistic bent and are indeed enamored of India's
 nuclear status. Moreover, the BJP election manifesto explicitly states that one
 of the party's intentions upon assuming power was to "induct nuclear weap-
 ons" into India's arsenal.107 Yet this argument ignores two critical pieces of
 evidence. First, the BJP government was heir to the huge scientific-military
 nuclear infrastructure that previous regimes of vastly divergent political per-
 suasions had forged. The BJP-led government could not have carried out the
 May tests in the absence of this well-established nuclear program. Second, this
 argument ignores India's perceived security threats from growing Chinese
 military capabilities and arms transfers to Pakistan. The most immediate
 provocation, of course, was Pakistan's launch in March 1998 of the Chinese-
 assisted Ghauri missile. The only compelling feature of this argument is that
 it underscores the BJP's more aggressive stance on questions pertaining to
 national security.
 A second argument holds that India's 1974 and 1998 tests were conducted
 to divert attention from the nation's crippling social and economic problems
 105. An important exception is Stephen P. Cohen, "India's Strategic Misstep," Nezv York Times, June
 3, 1998.
 106. The pioneering study of the BJP's origins, ideology, and organization remains Bruce Graham,
 Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh
 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also John Cherian, "The BJP and the
 Bomb," Frontline (Madras), April 24, 1998, pp. 4-9.
 107. On this point, see the BJP's 1998 election manifesto.
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 and to bolster the sagging fortunes of the ruling party.108 This argument clearly
 has some merit if one focuses on the timing of the 1974 test. Prime Minister
 Indira Gandhi did face a number of apparently intractable domestic problems
 that had eroded her popularity after the 1971 war against Pakistan. Conse-
 quently, the popularity of the nuclear test did provide her a brief political
 respite. Nevertheless, this argument is far from unproblematic. It can explain
 the occurrence of a discrete event but cannot account for the long-term invest-
 ments in nuclear infrastructure that enabled her to order the nuclear test. Even
 worse, those who resurrect this argument to account for the 1998 tests dem-
 onstrate remarkable insensitivity to the nuances of the contemporary Indian
 political landscape. The BJP-led government could hardly use this dramatic
 demonstration of India's nuclear capabilities to cement its ties with its fractious
 parliamentary allies. The coalition's differences stem from the quintessentially
 regional and parochial concerns of its members, cleavages that the nuclear
 decision will do little, if anything, to contain.
 A third argument posits that the tests reflect India's attempt to meet its
 unrequited goals for prestige and status in the international system.'09 The
 exponents of this view hold that India has long sought and failed to find
 adequate recognition of its status in global affairs. Indian decisionmakers,
 according to this logic, feel slighted by the most powerful states in the inter-
 national community despite India's size, economic potential, and civilizational
 heritage. The tests, it is contended, were designed to confer on India great
 power status. As Indians themselves have argued, it is no accident that the five
 permanent members of the UN Security Council possess nuclear weapons. But
 this argument fails to explain why previous regimes had not taken the same
 decision. If India's ebbing prestige had so concerned its elites, the tests should
 have come much earlier, especially in the waning days of the Cold War, when
 the country found itself adrift in the international order."10
 A fourth argument suggests that members of the scientific-bureaucratic
 establishment infused nuclear weapons with an almost mythical status, be-
 cause they believed that nuclear weapons would enhance India's security. On
 108. See the argument developed about the motivations underlying the 1974 test in Scott D. Sagan,
 "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security,
 Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 65-69. On the 1998 tests, see Mehta, "How a 'Tired' PM Became
 a 'Bold' PM."
 109. Amitav Ghosh, "Countdown," New Yorker, October 26-November 2, 1998, pp. 186-197.
 110. Sumit Ganguly, "South Asia after the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Autumn
 1992), pp. 173-184.
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 the other hand, they could not causally demonstrate how India's security
 would be greater through their acquisition."' As Peter Lavoy argues, "The
 identity, skill, and political power of the proponents of these myths ... also
 play a crucial role in shaping policy.""112 This argument, however, overlooks
 the structure of political decisionmaking in India. There is little question that
 it was under the tutelage of Homi Bhaba that the foundations of India's nuclear
 infrastructure were put in place in the first two decades after independence.
 But not all of his successors shared his level of enthusiasm for the acquisition
 of nuclear weapons. Some willingly followed the directions of their political
 masters in New Delhi; others were opposed to the development of nuclear
 weapons and made few efforts to boost India's weapons program. 13 Thus the
 scientific-bureaucratic community did constitute a significant pressure group.
 They protected the program from an excess of scrutiny and, on occasion,
 sought to mythologize the significance of nuclear weapons. However, the
 fundamental political decisions and strategic choices remained in the hands of
 political leaders in New Delhi, not in those of "mythmakers" in the AEC.
 Conclusion
 Two key questions confront India's political leadership. First, where are India's
 nuclear and ballistic missile programs headed? Unfortunately, few scholars or
 security analysts have devoted much thought to the development of a strategic
 doctrine for India."14 Only now, in the wake of the abrupt decision by the BJP
 government to test, have India's strategic minds begun to grapple with this
 difficult issue. In the absence of a clear-cut strategic doctrine, domestic scien-
 tific and technological capabilities and bureaucratic pressures are likely to
 drive the Indian nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Thus far, the political
 111. Peter Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol.
 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 192-212.
 112. Peter Lavoy, "South Asian Military Programs: Characteristics, Trends, Implications," paper
 presented at a conference entitled "The Impact of the South Asia Nuclear Crisis on the Nonpro-
 liferation Regime," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1998.
 113. For the views of the second chairman of the AEC, Vikram Sarabhai, about nuclear weapons
 and disarmament, see Sarabhai, "Security of Developing Countries," in Kamla Chowdhry, ed.,
 Science Policy and National Development (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1974). For the divergent views of
 various AEC chairmen, see Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage: An Autobiography (New Delhi:
 Penguin, 1991).
 114. George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
 1992). For a thoughtful discussion of a possible strategic posture for India in the aftermath of the
 nuclear tests, see Kapil Kak, "Strategic Template for Nuclear India," Times of India, August 11, 1998,
 p. 6.
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 leadership and most sections of India's strategic community have eschewed
 any interest in developing a second-strike capability. Instead they have argued
 that a "minimum deterrent" of some thirty to forty bombs that can be delivered
 by air would constitute a sufficient deterrent."15
 Second, would such a deterrent suffice against potential Chinese and Paki-
 stani threats and contribute to stability in the region? Despite U.S. and other
 international pressures, for now neither India nor Pakistan is likely to eschew
 its nuclear weapons program. Consequently, instead of focusing upon unreal-
 istic and chimerical goals, it may be more useful for all parties to discuss ways
 to bring some stability to the region. Three distinct forms of stability-strategic
 stability, crisis stability, and arms race stability-deserve discussion.
 Strategic stability occurs when both sides are assured that each has a secure
 second-strike capability-that is, adequate numbers of invulnerable nuclear
 weapons to inflict unacceptable damage after sustaining a nuclear attack. Crisis
 stability exists when neither side fears a preemptive strike. And finally, arms
 race stability reigns when neither side has concerns that its adversaries are
 trying to build weapons that undermine either strategic or crisis stability."16
 To what extent do these conditions now obtain on the subcontinent?"17
 India's concerns in these three realms involve two potential adversaries, China
 and Pakistan. Strategic stability does exist between India and Pakistan. Neither
 side can be certain that its extant capabilities will enable it to carry out a
 decapitating first strike. Consequently, a condition of mutual vulnerability will
 exist. Similarly, crisis stability is also likely to endure because neither side
 would be confident of destroying a substantial portion of the other's forces in
 a preemptive strike. The question of arms race stability is more vexing. The
 growth of ballistic missile capabilities on both sides may endanger strategic or
 crisis stability. Consequently, one of the principal priorities of the proponents
 of nuclear nonproliferation should be the development of measures to ensure
 arms race stability. To this end, India and Pakistan need to discuss missile
 production and deployment issues and move toward the creation of an arms
 control regime.
 115. Raj Chengappa and Manoj Joshi, "Future Fire," India Today International, May 25, 1998,
 pp. 22-24. See also Kapil Kak, "Command and Control of Small Nuclear Arsenals," in Singh,
 Nuclear India, pp. 266-285.
 116. On this point, see the discussion in Leon V. Sigal, "Warming to the Freeze," Foreign Policy,
 No. 48 (Fall 1982), pp. 54-65.
 117. I am grateful to Ashley Tellis of RAND for suggesting the application of these categories to
 the subcontinental nuclear context. The particular interpretations developed in this article are mine,
 however.
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 India's conventional forces are more than a match for China's capabilities.
 China's substantial nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities present problems
 for Indian defense planners, however. The current Sino-Indian relationship
 fails to meet the demands of strategic stability. India does not yet possess
 ballistic missile capabilities to target significant Chinese military or civilian
 assets. China, on the other hand, can inflict unacceptable damage on India.
 Crisis stability may be a bit stronger in this relationship, however. Given the
 acute secrecy surrounding the Indian nuclear weapons program and its dis-
 persed assets, few Chinese decisionmakers would contemplate a disarming
 preemptive strike. India, on the other hand, lacks the capability to similarly
 strike China. Finally, arms race stability between India and China is also
 problematic. The Chinese already possess intermediate-range ballistic missiles
 that can target portions of the Indian heartland."18 India, in turn, is developing
 the Agni II, which would be able to reach targets in southern China. The extant
 Chinese capabilities and incipient Indian capabilities threaten arms race stabil-
 ity. Thus, once mutual recriminations about the nuclear tests subside, it is
 imperative that India and China start discussions in conjunction with Pakistan
 about future force levels, deployments, and acquisitions. Now that the nuclear
 genie has escaped the bottle in South Asia, an arms control regime that
 involves China may offer the best hope of containing the genie's reach.119
 118. IISS, The Military Balance, 1997-98.
 119. For a thoughtful discussion of Chinese perspectives on arms control prior to the conclusion
 of the CTBT negotiations and the Indian nuclear tests, see Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser,
 "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter
 1995/96), pp. 43-78.
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